mirror of
https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs.git
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90 lines
3.6 KiB
Nix
90 lines
3.6 KiB
Nix
{
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config,
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pkgs,
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lib,
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...
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}:
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let
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cfg = config.programs.nekoray;
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in
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{
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options = {
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programs.nekoray = {
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enable = lib.mkEnableOption "nekoray, a GUI proxy configuration manager";
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package = lib.mkPackageOption pkgs "nekoray" { };
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tunMode = {
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enable = lib.mkEnableOption "TUN mode of nekoray";
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setuid = lib.mkEnableOption ''
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setting suid bit for nekobox_core to run as root, which is less
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secure than default setcap method but closer to upstream assumptions.
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Enable this if you find the default setcap method configured in
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this module doesn't work for you
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'';
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};
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};
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};
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config = lib.mkIf cfg.enable {
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environment.systemPackages = [ cfg.package ];
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security.wrappers.nekobox_core = lib.mkIf cfg.tunMode.enable {
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source = "${cfg.package}/share/nekoray/nekobox_core";
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owner = "root";
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group = "root";
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setuid = lib.mkIf cfg.tunMode.setuid true;
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# Taken from https://github.com/SagerNet/sing-box/blob/dev-next/release/config/sing-box.service
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capabilities = lib.mkIf (
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!cfg.tunMode.setuid
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) "cap_net_admin,cap_net_raw,cap_net_bind_service,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_dac_read_search+ep";
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};
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# avoid resolvectl password prompt popping up three times
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# https://github.com/SagerNet/sing-tun/blob/0686f8c4f210f4e7039c352d42d762252f9d9cf5/tun_linux.go#L1062
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# We use a hack here to determine whether the requested process is nekobox_core
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# Detect whether its capabilities contain at least `net_admin` and `net_raw`.
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# This does not reduce security, as we can already bypass `resolved` with them.
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# Alternatives to consider:
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# 1. Use suid to execute as a specific user, and check username with polkit.
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# However, NixOS module doesn't let us to set setuid and capabilities at the
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# same time, and it's tricky to make both work together because of some security
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# considerations in the kernel.
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# 2. Check cmdline to get executable path. This is insecure because the process can
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# change its own cmdline. `/proc/<pid>/exe` is reliable but kernel forbids
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# checking that entry of process from different users, and polkit runs `spawn`
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# as an unprivileged user.
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# 3. Put nekobox_core into a systemd service, and let polkit check service name.
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# This is the most secure and convenient way but requires heavy modification
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# to nekoray source code. Would be good to let upstream support that eventually.
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security.polkit.extraConfig =
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lib.mkIf (cfg.tunMode.enable && (!cfg.tunMode.setuid) && config.services.resolved.enable)
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''
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polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {
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const allowedActionIds = [
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"org.freedesktop.resolve1.set-domains",
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"org.freedesktop.resolve1.set-default-route",
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"org.freedesktop.resolve1.set-dns-servers"
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];
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if (allowedActionIds.indexOf(action.id) !== -1) {
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try {
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var parentPid = polkit.spawn(["${lib.getExe' pkgs.procps "ps"}", "-o", "ppid=", subject.pid]).trim();
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var parentCap = polkit.spawn(["${lib.getExe' pkgs.libcap "getpcaps"}", parentPid]).trim();
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if (parentCap.includes("cap_net_admin") && parentCap.includes("cap_net_raw")) {
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return polkit.Result.YES;
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} else {
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return polkit.Result.NOT_HANDLED;
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}
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} catch (e) {
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return polkit.Result.NOT_HANDLED;
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}
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}
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})
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'';
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};
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meta.maintainers = with lib.maintainers; [ aleksana ];
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}
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